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ABSTRACT

PREVENTATIVE FORCE AND THE RULES OF PROPORTIONALITY

Jacob Price
Political Science Department
Bachelor of Arts

The thesis examines how a tiered system of proportional rules will provide a
better understanding for how to use force outside of a declared conflict. The tiered system
provides explicit standards and subprinciples to determine how and when a foreign state
can use preventative force on specific targets. The thesis asserts that certain preventative
action against immediate and existential threats can be justified, but any demonstration of
force cannot continue beyond a threat incident. The thesis evaluates the current
demonstrations of force in Mexico, West Africa and situations involving weapons of
mass destruction. Through the tiered system, states can proportionally apply direct and
indirect force to help prevent incidents while maintaining a higher level of restraint on
applying deadly.
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Introduction
The rise of international competition as a means of influencing other states
motivates the United States to apply its Special Operation Forces (SOF) to prevent
situations from escalating to open conflict. The 9/11 terrorist attack illustrates the
increased threat that international actors have on states due to the increased access to
destructive means and materials. Small preventative forces allow states to quickly react to
these threats because of the speed, size, and impact that these groups have on situations
(Orr 2018, 14-15). Governments use preventive force to deter other states, but the
increased deployment of military units challenges the state’s ability to exercise restraint.
Circumstances in South America, Africa, and Asia increased the country’s reliance on
using force to influence these regions due to the increasing potential of actionable threats.
The increased access to information, communication, and tools created an even playing
field that allows most actors to effectively apply deadly force that could cause significant
damage and destabilization (Orr 2018, 32). The United States currently takes a more
proactive approach to threat prevention by sending SOF teams to address escalating risks
around the world.
The use of military units as a shaping tool raises questions about the role of the
military in an undeclared conflict. The military, as a whole, is a force created to engage
and destroy the enemies of the United States in armed conflict, but a paradigm shift
towards preventative measures creates a new dilemma for policymakers (Orr 2018).
Though SOF possesses different qualities than the standard military, these units are now
engaging in areas where the use of quick and effective force directly impacts state
relationships. This form of influence can lead to escalating international competition into
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a direct conflict between actors. The goal of this paper is to define the ethical role of
proportionality in applying force in pre-conflict areas.
The paper’s main claim will be that different levels of force can be used outside
of conflict zones to help shape and support countries as long as the action prevents an
escalation of violence. The paper wants to highlight how the principle of proportionality
can dictate what types of missions can be performed within these grey zones and evaluate
the changing role of preventative force. The paper focuses on how preventative force and
proportionality change the applicability of the principle of Last Resort with pre-conflict
areas. The biggest issue with the use force is the propensity for an increase in violence
when missions or objectives are not achieved by the nation deploying those forces (Long
2016, 38-43). The other major issue with proportionality revolves around providing a
framework that can identify when different levels of force can apply to a situation
(Brown(b) 2011). The paper will argue that a tiered response system can determine the
proportional application of preventative force to non-conflict zones. The paper continues
to argue that force should be restricted to immediate and existential threats in which the
tiered system would provide guidance for the evolving role of prevention. The paper will
conclude with a case study that evaluates the use of preventative force within three
different non-conflict zones.
The paper will argue that the US can apply limited force in non-combat zones
with the limitations included within the tiered system of the proportional use of force.
The paper will continue with a literature review that describes grey zones and incorporate
a brief overview of just war principles in the post 9/11 era. The theoretical section will
operationalize the principle of proportionality within the tiered system of evaluation and
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define the ethical limitations within the different levels. The goal of the theoretical
section will be to provide examples of how preventative force can be applied to the
current struggles with the Mexican cartels, the African war on Islamic extremism, and the
rogue use of weapons with mass destruction. The paper will conclude by examining the
importance of operating within the provided framework for both ethical and practical
reasons.
Literature Review
The principle of proportionality adequately explains how to ethically respond to
threats, but the principle receives little attention on how to articulate an actionable
framework for the use of preventative force. The literature review includes some
important features within Just War Theory that can provide the latitude to address the role
of force outside traditional interpretations of the war. The section will highlight the
context, definitions, and some theoretical arguments for each of the main topics within
the paper. The section should briefly prepare the reader to identify the ethical questions
involving intervention and preventative force within the framework of Just War Theory.
Just War Theory
Just War Theory attempts to philosophically identify how to ethically declare and
conduct a war. Just War Theory provides a rigorous framework to evaluate the ethical
application of war on other actors and this theory will provide a shared understanding of
the ethical limitations placed on the use of force. This portion of the literature review
briefly goes over the role of Just War Theory in western politics and gives a brief
summary of its general principles. The main role of this section will be to define the
concept of proportionality within pre-conflict situations and provide technical distinctions
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between proportionality before declared conflict and the other types of proportionality
used in Just War Theory.
The history of Just War Theory began as a religious debate and developed into a
philosophy that dictates how and when states should go to war. The theory spread from
the Catholic Church to secular institutions when it was adopted by governments and the
United Nations uses this framework to evaluate the necessity for any military action
against another state (Reiner 21, 2018; Lango 25, 2014). The theory was split into two
sections which cover how to justify a declaration of war and how to conduct one’s
military within an open conflict. The principles within Jus ad Bellum cover how states
can righteously declare war on other countries. And, Jus in Bello addresses what specific
principles should be used in order to ethically conduct a war against another country.
Jus ad Bellum establishes principles to allow nations to defend themselves
through the use of force along with providing higher standards that limit a state’s
propensity to apply force to situations. Thom Brooks explains that nations, like
individuals, possess an inherent right to defend themselves against foreign aggressors
(Brooks 1, 2012) The reason for framing the theory around defense is to limit the
justification for using war as a means to achieving other national interests. Jus ad Bellum
lists seven different characteristics which, if met, a nation could obtain ethical
justification for the use of military force. These criteria include the following principles:
“Just Cause”, “Last Resort”, “Reasonable Prospect of Success”, “Proportionality”, “Right
Authority”, “Right Intention”, and “Public Declaration” (Farrell 17-19, 2013). The use of
all seven different principles creates a strict barrier for justifying the use of military force
but these principles provide different levels of scrutiny based on their assumed definition.
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Many scholars argue over the degree to which these principles should be applied
to quarrels between states. Brooks asserts that if there exists “any likelihood” that a
situation meets all seven criteria, the theory will deem it ethical to use military force on
another nation (Brooks 90, 2012). But such probabilities of meeting these requirements
mean that any state would only use the loosest definitions of each criterion to justify the
application of the military to different situations. The loose interpretation of principles
removes the role of restraint on the user. Without a strict and specific interpretation, the
rules will not protect the user from unjust uses of force nor limit one’s own behavior. The
lack of applying a specific standard or level of scrutiny to each of the criteria makes it
difficult to hold states accountable to these principles (Kemp 1988, 60). A standard
threshold would eliminate the use of war based solely on the likelihood of a situation to
develop into war. The purpose of this philosophical undertaking will be to increase the
difficulty of the use of violence to influence others or prevent war.
International actors might be morally justified to declare war but starting a war
does not mean that a state can use any form of force to resolve the conflict. The ethical
use of military force includes regulating what kind of actions are considered appropriate
in a state of conflict. The ethical way to conduct war is outlined in five specific
principles. These principles include: “Proportionality”, “Noncombatant immunity or
discrimination”, “prisoner of war protections”, “No mala en se means (banned weapon
use)”, and “Adherence to any other international obligations or treaties” (Farrell 19-20,
2013). These principles place limits on the tools and methods that could be employed
within a combat environment. But, the restrictions beg the question of what is considered
inappropriate and excessive within a life and death competition?
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The restrictions placed on participants to limit the use of excessive means to gain
a specific outcome provide clarity for actors in declared conflicts, but some scholars
believe that these principles are ineffective when dealing with unconventional
combatants. The rise of unconventional conflicts strains the ability for nations to involve
their military forces to fix problems in the world (Dubik 8, 2016). Most scholars want to
bring about alternative principles or a reconstruction of Just War Theory to address the
philosophical issues that come about as war becomes increasingly complex. The limits
within Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello struggle to prevent and end the armed conflict with
unconventional aggressors (Buchanan 2006). The answer lies beyond the current
understanding of Just War Theory and the paper reconsiders what should be done before
states consider the use of violence to resolve issues.
Cosmopolitan Theory of Just War
The Cosmopolitan Theory of Just War justifies intervention and preventative
action due to an inherent obligation to protect human rights because rights ensure that
everyone enjoys the basic safety and freedom to live within this world. The protection of
basic rights outweighs the sovereignty of states because rights provide the means to
guarantee humane and equal treatment for all people, regardless of their circumstances.
Reiner and others find the need for an ethical means to intervene in humanitarian crises in
order to protect people (Reiner 10-11, 2018). The cosmopolitan perspective identifies a
responsibility to protect people and that military intervention would be necessary to
prevent the loss of rights and/or being subjected to inhumane circumstances (Fabre 2008,
966; Steinhoff 2014). The author emphasizes the inherent obligation that people have to
each other and the need to reinterpret Just War Theory through the context of a global
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community (Lango 25, 2014). Part of that obligation and responsibility to protect people
from injustice and suffering comes from the shared identity that everyone possesses. The
use of preventative force allows for the world community to both protect its members and
establish a shared identity around equality and justice. The cosmopolitan theory allows
for more flexibility in dealing with security issues around the world, but it raises issues
about how to limit the use of military force to solve world issues?
The cosmopolitan theory provides latitude for such actions, and the paper will
identify specific requirements for different forms of intervention and the use of military
force outside of conflict areas. The cosmopolitan perspective identifies important
questions about justifying force, and the paper will create structured limits on the type of
intervention that the military can use within humanitarian crises. The main issue with the
recent explanations of Just War Theory revolve around the actual operationalization of
the limitations placed on the use of force. The paper will operationalize the principle of
proportionality on the use of force in preventative, humanitarian, and grey zone issues.
The explicit application of limitations remains the biggest issue within adapting these
philosophical principles into organizations like Special Operations. The
operationalization of proportionality will provide clear thresholds and parameters for
ethical action within these difficult situations.
Three-Tiered Proportionality
The three-tiered proportionality test actively evaluates the need for violence
across a sliding scale that allows for states to respond to a variety of potential threats. The
paper argues that the principle of Last Resort fails to address the nuances of modern
threats within uncertain environments and the repurposed definition of proportionality

7

can sufficiently reduce and control the use of rapid force within these complex areas. The
tiered proportional system will demonstrate clear limitations for applying force and
explain why proportionality provides the best process for escalating responses to the
potential employment of violence.
The role of last resort dramatically changed over the last few decades due to
technology, politics, and opportunity found with international relations. The increased
efficiency of technology altered the speed of communication and the effectiveness of
weapons, both of which caused states to consider more proactive responses to
competitive action on the world stage (Orr 2018, 32). The changes within all three of
these areas mentioned above have illustrated the diminished ability for states to react to
threats. Instead of mobilizing armies, countries face threats of terrorism, direct challenges
to authority that challenges the legitimacy of states, and rapid deployment of mass
casualty weapons (Orr 2018; Brown 2013, Schulte 2008). The principle of last resort
slowly changed due to the balancing effect that technology has on methods of force.
Modern states do not face clear, identifiable threats. Technology decreased the level of
certainty in identifying combatants and increased the levels of risk that states must
assume when dealing with these complex threats (Adams and Goodman 2018). Tiered
proportionality provides an alternative solution for addressing the modern challenges
associated with the new types of threats associated with modern technology.
The principle of last resort slowly died within the years between the Persian Gulf War
and the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Bad actors increasingly relied on technology and
indirect competition as a means to challenge states and slowly distance themselves from
conventional means for addressing grievances. Connectivity and accessibility have
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democratized coercive power by providing immediate access to harmful tools. Instead of
following international norms for the use of force, groups have relied on unconventional
methods of force and communication to effect changes. The deterioration of the state’s
monopoly on the use of force caused sovereigns to engage in alternative forms of control
over their affairs and relationships within the international community (Correa Cabrera,
Keck, and Nava 2015). With increased access (due to technology), anyone can create and
employ modern weapons at extreme magnitudes and these coercive resources challenge
the concept of states waiting for signs of aggression. The slow erosion of conflict
boundaries officially came to an end when the Twin Towers fell.
The paper argues that states should be allowed to employ proactive force to deter
and destroy threats based on a proportional response system. The paper limits itself to the
use of small and quick responses to crises and will not address large scale operations to
deter threats. The tiered system focuses on the sudden appearance of threats and not
prolonged challenges that might exist between states and/or actors. The tiered response
system can help provide ethical guidance to the different activities that can be performed
based on the relative size, speed, and impact that an aggressor may pose on people and
property. The principle of proportionality focuses on applying force equivalent to the
speed and impact of the potential threat on third parties and/or one’s own nation. The
ultimate purpose of the system will be to eliminate any form of direct violence onto any
target that does not present significant capabilities and intentions to care out threats
(Adams and Goodman 2018). The tiered system argues that only under extreme cases,
should governments use preventative force outside of prolonged engagements (Orr 2018,
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14). These extreme situations will be generally outlined in this section, but a contextual
explanation will follow in the case study.
The tiered system includes explicit requirements that would limit the application
of violent force because the use of proportional force would require states to solely
engage threats according to their level of capability. The system highlights a sliding scale
of force that a government should use with threats and places serious thresholds that
require reasonable certainty about the situation and the target. The system includes
principles and thresholds to identify when states can resort to violence to address a threat.
The tiered system outlines three distinct categories that could occur before a situation
escalates into conflict.
1. There exists competing interest within the region which does not put lives
or property at risk. This tier includes situations where political and
economic changes occur without causing systematic violence.
2. There exist relative violence and instability in the area, but no immediate
existential threat puts populations or strategic property at risk of being
destroyed.
3. Only when an existential threat which will result: (1) The death of a
significant number of people and/or the immediate destruction of property
that could negatively affect a majority of people in the area and (2) the
damage would not be recovered or restored within a specific timeframe
can states employ rapid violence.
The tiers identify how proportionality can be operationalized into international
relations by creating a framework to evaluate crises. The three tiers represent a general
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grading system to evaluate situations within pre-conflict zones, and the system provides
clear thresholds for measuring a situation’s progression towards conflict. The system
provides an intrinsic definition of what it means to proportionally respond to international
competition by narrowing the threat of danger to definitions on time, size, and impact of
the threat. By identifying the threat level, states can appropriately determine what type of
actions could be taken in order to address threats. Proportional force on a threat is
determined by the relationship between the time of response a nation has to address the
threat and the impact that the incident would have on a third party and/or one’s own
nation. With increased capability and willingness comes a possibility for states to use
more lethal action to prevent catastrophe. Within this framework, many current
operations would be considered unethical due to the use of violence in situations outside
of extreme severity.
The tiered proportionality response produces two major challenges to its
theoretical application due to its limitations and its operationalization of criteria. These
two challenges highlight important nuances in applying proportionality to the use of
force. The tiered system reduces the coverage that the military has on responding to
humanitarian issues by emphasizing limits on the time it takes for a situation to develop.
The restriction to immediate and existential threats also creates an ethical dilemma of
enforcing ethical means instead of emphasizing results. The system desires positive
results but recognizes that the means protect actors from additional burdens that
accompany unethical behavior. The other challenge with the tiered system entails
selecting adequate definitions that both limits yet enables states to apply military force to
stop immediate existential threats found around the world (Lohaus 2016, Burgos 2018).
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These two issues will be discussed further within this section with the purpose of
addressing their theoretical stipulation. Further discussion and application will be
presented in the case study in order to demonstrate the method of evaluating grey zone
situations.
Operationalizing the definitions of immediate and existential creates clear
identifiers for states to measure the severity of a situation and assign an appropriate
response that correlates with the size, speed, and impact of a threat. The tiered system
above asserts that existential means that any action that would cause enough damage to
permanently affect the subject in which it would not be able to recover from its losses
(Brown(c) 2011). So, an existential attack must debility state to the point where only
assistance could prevent and/or restore the losses within a generation (15 years) of time.
The extremity of the threat depends on context, but the magnitude of the impact needs to
equal to actions that could justify a declaration of war. A state’s response must correlate
to the size and the proportion that the threat. The greater the impact, the more latitude a
state has in addressing the situation. The three factors of size, recovery, and impact
provide the necessary benchmarks to measure the severity of an event, but severity does
not justify the initiation of force within grey zones.
The incorporation of immediacy, or a time frame limitation, helps distinguish the
difference between when a state can use military force or if the state should make a more
formal declaration of war. Immediately, in terms of grey zone activity, is measured by the
rate of distribution, implementation, and destruction a weapon or force has on people or
property (Schulte 2008; Lohaus 2016, 86-87). The factor of time allows leaders to
identify the necessary response speed to stop an existential threat. Proportionality would
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prevent the use of rapid force if the existential threat does not impose an immediate
danger. A soft timeframe should include ways to gauge the ability and capacity of an
actor by distinguishing the difference between threats as an event versus a continuous
competitive state. A continuous state of competition does not merit the use of quick force
due to the longevity and lack of precision. Threats as an event allow for rapid force to
produce results and isolate the use of force to a moment rather than creating a perpetual
phase of violence. A threat that persists longer than a moment or instance requires a
different approach and not any use of quick force. Limiting the immediacy to an event
rather than a situation will provide a soft threshold for other institutions to act on the
situation while providing explicit limitations for the use of preventative force on
immediate threats.
By limiting immediacy to an event allows for Just War principles to occur in
normal situations while creating an ethical opening for the use of force against immediate
and existential threats. The rule highlights the distinction of time that applies to
proportionality. The tiered system focuses on fast and impactful threats which, by their
nature, remove the ability to consider other alternatives outside the use of rapid force
(Whitman 2006, 28; Yarger 2013, 31). The intention of the rule is to provide a limitation
to the use of rapid force on targets by forcing a state to consider alternative methods for
situations that have no immediate impact. The tiered system strictly addresses immediate
threats, in terms of an event, and defers further evaluation of other forms of intervention
to other theoretical guidelines, preferable Just War Theory. Slow-moving threats and
persistent issues do not merit rapid force because they fail to meet the immediacy
requirement found within the three-tiered system. Threats that fail to meet these criteria
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mentioned above would result in applying the basic principles of Just War Theory to the
situation because the circumstance requires other forms of force to be taken against a
threat.
In the case of a slow-moving threat, the immediacy distinction helps illustrate the
progression of violence in grey zones, and these issues illustrate the role of the tiered
proportionality system within a Just War evaluation. The tiered system explains how
competition converts into conflict by measuring threats on a sliding scale. Competition,
as mentioned above, occurs when actors challenge each other through means other than
direct military action (Orr 2018, 3-5). Competition turns into a conflict when sustained
violence occurs and there has been no implementation of Just War Principles by any of
the actors (Orr 2018, 3-5). Formal declarations turn conflict into war, which includes
more formal factors like defining what constitutes an enemy combatant and a formal
recognition of the conflict on both sides (Orr 2018, 3-5). The distinction between each of
the terms illustrates the progression of violence which would warrant the use of
proportional force based on the severity of the situation. The tiered system only focuses
on everything below the level of conflict. Further escalation requires Just War Theory
and other ethical programs to be incorporated into determining the right use of force
within a situation. Different ethical frameworks should be applied to more systemic
demonstrations of force. The tiered proportionality system should only address the ethical
behavior of force within certain events that pose significant impacts on people and
property.
Though the tiered system provides clear guidance on the use of force in grey
zones, it structurally defers to other ethical frameworks to address the possibility of using
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military intervention within other crises. The tiered proportionality system poses three
major points of conflict for ethicists. The tiered system does not justify the use of force
on systematic repression, it removes the ability for SOF units to capture/kill high-value
targets outside of conflict areas and not giving permission for states to destroy
organizations that produce structural violence. These three issues are considered to be
major ethical challenges that need to be addressed, but the tiered system prevents the use
of rapid force as a tool to stop these injustices. The case study will address all three
situations and provide further information on the appropriate use of force within these
situations. The theory does not condone these actions but recognizes a need to impose
restraint on the use of deadly force, especially as a preventative measure. The general
response to these issues revolves around applying an evaluation of immediacy and the
impact of these threats on the world. When addressing these issues, the case study
highlights different thresholds that act as key indicators for determining the use of force
within a given situation.
Within the tiered system, only the third tier justifies the use of violent action, but
the other tiers include additional subprinciples to regulate unethical behavior that appears
when providing support and assistance. The framework inherently is averse to the use of
violence and requires a significant level of certainty about the nature of the threat. The
military force should only be used to protect states from existential threats that would
result in its extermination or paralysis (Brown 2013). Especially with the rise in
executable threats, direct action should only be permitted in grey zones if the results of
the threat pose an imminent danger to people and property. Anything more or less does
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not require violence or states should consider a more formal escalation of force through
the use of Just War Theory in order to eliminate an explicit enemy.
Proportionality within this tiered system can limit the use of force outside of war
within our modern era by reducing a state’s reliance on this tool to influence others. The
US and other nations have failed to draw clear lines for justifiable force, especially in
grey zone situations. Through examining three different scenarios where force has been
applied outside of declared conflict, the paper will demonstrate how the tiered system
resolves the ethical issues involved with using preventative force outside of war.
Case Study
The case study will examine three different situations in which the use of rapid
force might be employed. Each situation will begin with a brief summary of the recent
events within the area and prescribe situational ranking within the tiered system. The
main portion of this section will be to demonstrate how proportionality within the tiered
system can produce limitations on the use of rapid force. The paper uses Special
Operations as a motif of rapid force throughout the paper due to the nature of the unit
within the US military, but the rules extend to other organizations that can be used as a
rapid force. Each section will highlight some challenges that the tier system experiences
within the given scenario. The potential issues with the tiered system will be addressed
by applying sub principles of proportionality to the situation. The sub principles help
operationalize proportionality within the situation and provide a definitive resolution to
the situational issue. The section will also highlight activities and actions that are
permitted within different scenarios. The section will end by highlighting the reasons for
limiting the use of force within the given scenario.
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Mexican Cartels
The Mexican Cartels have noticeably expanded their influence within the region
and the United States wants to counterbalance the effects of their illicit activities. The
US’s employment of vast resources to challenge the influence of cartel activity and the
growing violence raises ethical questions about the use of force (Morris 2013; Bonner
2012; Farwell and Arakelian 2014, 49-50). The way the US presents options for the use
of force highlights an underlying concern about the proportionality of their actions in
relation to the threat. The United States seeks further involvement in the situation because
the US government sees cartels as destabilizing agents, and major sources of unethical
activities (Farwell and Arakelian 2014, 46). The US perceives this kind of competition as
a legitimate excuse for applying multidimensional pressure to check the influence of
cartels. The use of rapid force would only be a part of the entire strategy to deal with the
threat that the cartels impose.
The depth of cartel influence on politics and economics increases the likelihood
that the US will escalate its police efforts to incorporate a more militaristic approach. The
recent events involving the Sinaloa Cartel’s ability to repulse the Mexican military
illustrates the power and determination that this alternative influence has on regional and
international politics (Bonner 2012, 13). The demonstration of force compels politicians,
policymakers, and academics to reconsider the effectiveness of their current policies
(Long 2016, 44). The escalation of violence and increasingly direct competition against
state authority raises questions about the use of foreign forces as tools to directly attack
and/or influence the political and economic climate within Mexico. The US continues to

17

offer its support to Mexico as the US begins to consider the risk that cartels have on both
people and property.
The cartels’ direct impact on local and foreign populations challenge the methods
of using rapid force because the cartel organization goes beyond a single incident or
threat. The cartel’s ability to challenge the authority and legitimacy of governments
through a variety of means poses a direct threat to a nation (Grayson 2009). The use of
rapid force could produce some relief within some situations, but the threat goes beyond
any single event or person. The US employed its Special Operations units to Mexico as a
means to assist Mexico’s efforts to reduce the influence of these organizations. The
Special Operations units possess the ability to provide a direct impact on a situation, but
can military force adequately address the underlying issues of this situation? What is the
proportional response to cartel activity?
Within the tiered system, the situation receives a rating within the first category
because cartels do not pose the capability or the intent to immediately harm a significant
number of people and property. The cartel situation occasionally develops into a tier twoissue, but cartels do not benefit from continued instability. Though violence is a frequent
tool employed against the government, any destruction or death is a side product of the
business (Morris 2013, 33). Cartels react negatively to economic pressures and rely on
stability within the regions where they produce and distribute their goods. Even when the
cartels repulsed the military, the isolated situation did escalate to affect large groups of
people or property. The lack of motivation to produce significant harm creates a barrier
for any application of military violence on the issue. Cartel activity is more parasitical
than detrimental because they rely on the very system they subvert. So, Cartels will not
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create any incident that poses an immediate existential threat because they use the current
system to support their activities. The lack of an immediate existential incident limits
military involvement to training, advising, and assisting the Mexican government in their
efforts to fight Cartel violence.
The two big challenges within this case come from determining what role does
advising, assisting and training have on the situation and when does destabilization of a
government warrant military intervention? The use of explicit definitions and applying
the concepts of existential and immediate to the situation provides the necessary
limitations on rapid force within Mexico. Extrapolating the meaning of existential and
immediate allows all actors, regardless of the level of commitment, to impose restraint in
dealing with the challenges associated with cartels. Definitions highlight explicit
requirements and limitations on permissible action within the situation and the tier system
allows for the government to proportionally address the changes within the situation.
Assigning specific meaning to existential, immediate, and permissible actions allows for
actors to identify the limitations and qualifications for rapid force.
Defining the roles and the limitation on the use of force exposes the concerns
about what would be considered military force, even if not directly applied to a
competitive target. All of these terms possess a latitude of interpretation within the
government and the military and the goal is to provide some shared understanding about
specific concepts that involve the use of force. The purpose of these definitions will be to
identify how force can be employed in these areas. The lack of centralizing the
definitions of the three roles mentioned above creates an ethical grey area for operations
in undeclared conflict zones (Lohaus 2016, Yarger 2013). The three roles tend to blend
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together and sometimes incorporate accidental demonstrations of force. The lack of
clarity results in the potential escalation of violence or accidental violation of ethical
values. The limitations will include evaluating intentions and consequences that occur
due to the new rule (Cole 2011,177). Justification for these definitions will put into
context the dilemma of Mexican Cartels and will be presented in terms of proportional
escalation of force through direct and indirect means.
The role of advising means that the US government can help plan, provide
expertise and judgment in support of Mexican interests (Farwell and Arakelian 2014, 4850; Burgos 2018). The activity of advising requires a limited presence of US armed
personnel, mostly likely Special Operations. Additionally, advising is limited to an
exchange of ideas and information between leadership and this role does not extend down
to subordinate levels of activity. This role does not include the employment of resources
beyond the educational and instructional guidance to senior leaders (Priest 2013). The
ultimate decision to use material or violence will be left up to the foreign government’s
discretion which means that the foreign government will take full responsibility for what
happens in the situation. The advisors will not be directly engaged in any position that
would insight or provoke violence upon any US personnel.
Applying this to the Cartels, Special Operations Groups can mentor and provide
guidance to leaders on who, what, where, when, and how to address the influence of the
cartels. But, the advisory role (and all other roles under tier one and two) will not be able
to engage in any direct action due to the threat’s lack of immediacy and impact. This and
other activities that will soon be discussed illustrate the indirect role that foreign
governments can have on the use of force. The tier system removes the obligation of
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preventative force from foreign actors within tier one and two because both tiers lack any
possibility for a singular event that could cause permanent or significant damage to a
nation. Indirect forms of force and influence can be provided through these three roles
because each of these roles can be adjusted according to the severity of the situation. The
limitations on these roles will prevent accidental uses of force and/or an escalation of
conflict involving the US within the situation.
The reason for limiting participation within this scenario results in providing a
proportional response to the situation. There is no imminent threat to a significant number
of people or property and cartels do not plan to radically alter the current state of affairs.
Though cartels engage in many unethical activities, it does not require armed conflict or
intervention by foreign governments. Speaking ethically, proportional responses to cartel
crime would fall under police action or other means of influencing. Alternative methods
of influencing will not be discussed here. The main purpose is to highlight the lack of
impact and immediacy of harm to the US and other nations. What course of action
Mexico decides to pursue will be left to their political leaders but, for the US, applying
military force would accelerate violence instead of preventing further issues. Responding
to Cartel activities requires more than just a quick demonstration of force. The issue of
force does not seem as apparent within the advisor role of Special Operations, but the
following terms will present possibilities of US exposure to direct action.
The concept of training foreign forces includes teaching, demonstrating, and
rehearsing concepts within a non-combative situation (Dean et al. 2012; Priest 2013).
Training can be taken further by allowing on-the-objective teaching in which US special
operations would be part of the mission, but the concept of training within a tier-one or
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two scenario should bar any possibility of direct contact with possible hostile individuals
and/or organizations. There is merit in providing training during operations, but, the US
is ethically barred from putting US personnel into potentially violent situations. The goal
of training is to transfer expertise so that others may address the issue. The purpose of
training is to raise the technical and tactical proficiencies and those two purposes do not
require putting US units in compromising or dangerous situations (Bonner 2013, 14-15).
The limitation on training allows for indirect assistance on the cartel issue by raising the
capability level of the police and military forces. The goal of this action is to keep the
situation in a competitive state and to increase stability, not to increase US participation.
Training provides usable knowledge for Mexico to address the rise of Cartel violence
without involving US soldiers.
Along with training, military assistance is defined as providing intellectual,
physical and material support for operations without directly engaging in activities that
produce or entice military direct action on an objective or individual (Dean et al. 2012;
Priest 2013). Same as the concepts above, it removes operators from being responsible
for the use of force and preventing any situation where ethical norms could be violated.
Assistance within a tier-one or two situations only allows the US to assume a supporting
role within the contested areas. Supporting roles facilitate and supply Mexican
Operations and indirectly influence the use of force by the host nation. Assistance can be
a tool for the Mexican Government to use but should not be a means for intervention.
A proportional response allows for assistance, training, and advising without direct
involvement because Mexican Cartels’ influence extends beyond its border. Both groups
extended their influence beyond the confines of Mexico which means that each group
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directly or indirectly is receiving support in order to gain or maintain its control (Morris
2013). The international nature of the situation allows for groups to pick sides, but the
lack of immediate existential impacts prevents foreigners from directly involving
themselves. Each of these definitions helps provide a framework for a proportional
response and restraint on the use of force while allowing governments to contribute to
situations.
The other main issue with Cartels involves the role that the US has on applying
military force on unstable states. Though the US has advocated the use of force to prevent
escalating issues, instability within states occurs for reasons that cannot be solved by
foreign intervention or simple changes in power (Vallings and Moreno-Torres 2005,
Lauer 2019, 108-109). In order to not introduce the additional topics, the paper asserts
that the purpose of proportionality is to limit and reduce the acceptable use of violent
force on any state or non-state entity. Intervention requires more formal avenues of
participation that can be highlighted in Just War Theory because intervention requires a
sustainment process. The tier system does not focus on rehabilitating or prolonged
engagements, but preventative action would be considered within the framework. The
tiered framework defends the role of prevention in as much as the efforts are quick and
isolated to a specific incident. Proportional responses require an equivalent escalation of
force, and preventative action could occur if the threat causes immediate and substantial
damage to people and property. The section on weapons of mass destruction will provide
more context on how prevention would work with the use of rapid force within the tiered
framework.
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Within the Mexican Cartel scenario, the institution neither causes an immediate
significant loss of life or damage to property. The lack of immediacy prevents the use of
rapid force because the threat will not occur within a timeframe that prevents
policymakers from considering alternative responses (Farwell and Arakelian 2014).
Cartel Violence, over time, produces a noticeable loss of life within Mexico but the
violence will not radically increase, threatening major populations or directly causing the
destruction of property. The prolonged situation fails to identify any specific incident that
would justify preventative force in order to protect people and property.
The negative effects of cartel violence and its influence is not overlooked, but in
terms of applying rapid force, the issue cannot justify direct military involvement. The
use of US military force does not proportionally correspond to the organized crime that
the Mexican Cartels produce (Carpenter 2019). The lack of immediate existential threats
places serious limitations on the reliance on violence as the answer because cartel
violence is reactional (Carpenter 2019). Cartels use of violence as a means of response
because cartels react to threats. Without the immediacy or scale of destruction, violence
can be avoided within this situation. The cartel problem requires the use of alternative
approaches like sanctions, economic barriers, police actions, NGO work and other
organizations to address this issue (Wattenbarger 2019, Carpenter 2019, Morris 2013).
So, applying a team of Special Operators to kill/capture leaders in the cartel is an overly
aggressive tactic for the issue at hand and the responsibility for this issue should be
transferred to other institutions.
The implications for this section on Mexican Cartels include revising or removing
Special Operations from participating in direct action activities in Mexico and need to
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create significant barriers to the application of violence with problems found within tier
one or two. The application of proportionality to an unstable grey zone illustrates the
gradual increase in activity that can be taken by armed forces within the competitive
region (Lauer 2019, 104-105). It also creates a higher threshold for applying force on
competitive situations. Though I do not advocate for their activities, it remains ethically
intolerable to use violence as a means to prevent or destroy the cartels in Mexico.
West African Islamic Extremism
In West Africa, an increasing rise in religious extremism and instability
challenges sovereignty within the region. Groups like Boko Haram, AQIM, Al-Shabaab,
and other groups established organizations that use the different types of social divisions
within the region to promote Islamic fundamentalism (Friend 2018). These groups seek
to undermine the authority of states in the region and the United States believes these
groups are exacerbating crises within the Western Africa region (Burgos 2018, 111). The
growing instability and violence encourage conflict over the methods used to solve the
region's growing economic and political inequality (Cormier 2017; Friend 2018). The
instability and lack of control by the formal governments caused countries like the United
States and France to send Special Operation units into the region to help build the state,
counter-terrorist activity and put down insurgencies within the region.
The United States employs its military forces to help strengthen internal defenses
and the government’s ability to respond to the terror groups within the region. Special
Operation forces currently incorporate diplomatic, and military skills in an effort to
combat the growing strife within the region. These units advise, train, and assist
governments in reducing internal threats by strengthening the capacity of the government
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to respond to issues. Even with the support of the United States, the terrorist
organizations caused over 2 million people to migrate away from their homes and the
West felt obligated to increase its commitment to resolving the crisis (Burgos 2018, 111112). Even with the introduction of small amounts of force, the West African extremism
exemplifies how the use of force does not resolve complex international crises and it
raises concerns about the ethics of applying force during times of instability.
The West African situation falls is a tier two scenario on the proportionality scale
and the growing crisis contains elements that could escalate the issue to the highest tier.
The situation requires a contextual analysis to determine which threats within the region
would need the use of force to prevent further issues. Not every nation in West Africa
faces an existential threat to their infrastructure or population (Cormier 2017). Most
states in the region would fall under the category defined by unstable states and smallscale violence. Other states, like Nigeria and Mali, could warrant a greater response due
to the type of threats that the terror organizations make on major ethnic and religious
groups (Cormier 2017). Threats against portions of society can pose an immediate
existential impact and the use of rapid force might be necessary to prevent significant
damage. The situation could also warrant the implementation of traditional Just War
Theory to justify more protracted uses of force. The major issue within this section
revolves around determining whether quick force or protracted war provides the best
ethical solution.
Within West Africa, the tiered proportionality system addresses three distinct
areas of concern which include identifying the threshold for applying violence, the role of
force in humanitarian issues, and when a state should stop using force within a situation.
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These three areas highlight the transitional concerns for applying force outside of
declared conflict. This section is concerned about a state’s ability to determine the
necessity and the type of force to be applied to growing threats. The goal of this section
will be to highlight the transition point between different methods of force and
identifying if force is necessary for the situation. Concerning extremism in Africa, in
most states, there are no immediate threats to large populations or risk of severe damage
to property, specifically infrastructure and economically valuable property (Friend 2018;
Ademola-Adelehin and Smith 2018). The states that experience a higher tier two or low
tier-three crisis are Mali and Nigeria (civil wars and other crises exist but will not be
addressed). These two states possess higher risks for violence and have already
experienced a significant loss of life, damage to property, and forced migration.
Mali and northern Nigeria exemplify crises that experience aspects from both a
tier-two and tier-three situation due to the occasional threat that poses a significant risk
on people and property. Nigeria and Malia are locations where states or other
international actors are experiencing the transition from competition to open conflict
between major actors. This grey zone reflects the point in which rapid force might be
considered as part of a temporary solution for the issues within the region but this
transition phase struggles to identify justifications for a formal declaration of war or some
recognition of prolonged conflict (Orr 2018; Toner 2010; Schulzke 2013). The transition
to the use of force can only occur if the risk of a threat has both immediate and existential
impacts on the people and property within the state.
Within the tiered framework, the transition from passive assistance to active
military action occurs when the state can identify an actor’s capability and intent to
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destroy people and property. This part of proportionality directly links into the other
aspects of Just War Theory but, to prevent an expanded examination of other Just War
principles, the paper will focus on the sub principles of corresponding responses and the
intent of the threat. Both subprinciples highlight a need to impose attitudes of
proportionality on the use of force. These subprinciples highlight an important check on
rapid force activities by illustrating a specific intent through the creation of clear goals
and applying an equivalent response to the situation (Orr 2018; Kemp 1988, 66). The
principle of intent forces organizations to create specific goals and limits on the
application of force by requiring policymakers and politicians to consider the outcomes
of violence within the situation (Long 2016; Rubright 2016, 137). Foreign actors need to
consider the use of more explicit plans for the use of force because goals give the use of
force meaning and limits. Without identifying the desired result, force loses its ethical
legitimacy because policymakers failed to connect the means to the ends for their
preventative action. Goals provide limits on the application by signal a specific end to the
use of force. The use of goals operationalizes the intent for the units that will be applying
rapid force. Intent allows for units to recognize the meaning behind the limits placed on
the means and ends of within the grey zone.
A challenge for the sub principle of intent might be the creation of an overzealous
or ambiguous policy that extends the use of force beyond a specific threat. The second
sub principle of corresponding response would prevent any unethical goal by imposing
additional limitations on the method of force. The corresponding response principle
requires that any use of force not exceed the force being used by the threatening entity
(Brown(c) 2011, 224). In this case, the military would create boundaries that limit the use
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of excessive instruments or methods of force that do not correspond to the situation. In
Africa, that would mean that the use of force should not extend beyond eliminating the
possibility of an existential incident within the country
The second and third major issues within this African example highlights the role
of humanitarian intervention and the role of military force. Humanitarian intervention
receives lots of attention in academic literature that will not be introduced here. The
paper will only address the role of rapid force within humanitarian crises. The tiered
proportionality system, generally, requires that militaries stay away from economic and
political crises because these issues require more resources and expertise found outside of
its institution (Cormier 2017). Humanitarian issues, generally, do not require the use of
quick military force (usually performed by Special Operations units), because these crises
develop over a significant period of time and would involve more than just a quick
military strike on a target. Only when a crisis involves an entity's immediate destruction
of people and/or strategic property can the US apply force proportional to the threat level
within the situation.
In West Africa, the humanitarian crises in northern Nigeria and Mali resulted in a
persistent threat against ethnic and religious groups. Boko Haram and AQIM directly
caused the flight of over 2 million people due to its violent intentions. Boko Haram also
has attacked other strategic economic properties that jeopardize the economic and
physical safety of other people (Onuoha 2010; 58-60). The organizations’ effect on
people and property verges on creating permanently damaging the state because the terror
organizations jeopardize the safety and sustainability of major portions of the population.
Both groups are in a transitional phase (from the second to the third tier) on the
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proportionality system. The negative impact on people and property begs the question of
what is the threshold between the two tiers?
The existential threshold for applying force can be determined through two
questions: “Will the action result in significant damage to people and property” and “can
the society recover or replace the asset without significant difficulty”? The first question
highlights the basic tenets of within Tier 3 and has been discussed above. The second
question requires deeper reflection because ethnic groups and states do not possess the
same abilities to overcome the loss. In the case of Africa, the loss of 1000 people (though
horrific) can be recovered in time without significant issues, but the loss of 10,000 within
a specific region would create a lasting impact on the effectiveness of the community for
a significant amount of time. The same goes for strategic property loss, if the property
loss would be difficult to restore or recover, then a threat of its destruction would be an
existential threat to the community and state.
To define a community’s loss threshold is both difficult and subjective. Difficulty
to recover can mean many things but, within the context of using rapid force, any act that
results in a community’s inability to recover the asset, whether people or property, within
a generation (15 years) of time is considered an existential crisis (Buchanan 2006, 18-19).
This definition prevents the possibility of violent escalations over small acts of
destruction but gives enough weight to justify extreme countermeasures against acts of
atrocity (Brown(b) 2011, 222). This measurement is relative to the situation and
circumstance, but the general rule for these crises is that recovery outweighs the need for
force. Any incident or capability that creates existential levels of destruction would
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qualify for considering the use of quick force if the force results in reducing the threat
level back to a lower tier.
The last main issue within the African example highlights discrepancies over
when a state should end its use of force or whether the issue should be upgraded to a
declared conflict zone. Within the example, determining whether military action should
end or escalate is determined by the immediacy and persistence of the threat (Reiner
2018). If the threat persists after the use of rapid force, the use of traditional Just War
Theory can resolve the ethical issues of starting and conducting war. If the situation
requires a continuous to use military force, then states need to transition the situation into
a declared conflict zone. Using the traditional Just War principle will permit for a state's
ethical entrance into the area and allow for additional resources to be applied to the
situation (Reiner 2018). The continuation of violence changes the grey zone into a
conflict area. This transition changes the ethical context for imposing external force
which means that the tiered system would not apply.
If the terror group lacks the ability to carry out the existential threat, the foreign
state (US) should relinquish power back to the host nation. The lack of existential threats
means that the situation devolved to one of the lower tiers. A de-escalation of violence
removes the US’s ethical justification for applying force. The devolution of force does
not remove the ability to influence host nation activities, it just bars them from using
violence as a policy tool because the ability of the enemy to cause harm has been reduced
to manageable levels. So, proportionally, the US cannot use force against an entity that
does not pose an immediate significant threat to the state.
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The implications of this section conclude that the US may use rapid force in some
states that experience an immediate existential threat to people and property. The
threshold creates a clear barrier that policymakers can use to use force after identifying
the intent and the corresponding level force. Within this example, the US can use force to
help reduce the possibility of an existential incident within a humanitarian crisis, but the
use of general force would be subjected to other ethical models. The tiered system also
signals to the host nation their responsibilities and roles within these situations by
limiting how foreign nations apply force. The tiered system illustrates how the
proportional use of force progressively changes within a complex situation. The situation
also demonstrates the limits of the tiered ethical framework within conflict and this
section illustrates the joint roles that other ethical models have in helping regulate
behavior.
CBRNE Weapons (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Electronic)
The threat of weapons of mass destruction creates an existential risk to a state’s
survival and, under these threats, states possess extreme discretion over the use of force.
The increased access to these kinds of weapons requires a proportional framework for
applying force against organizations and people that threaten to use these instruments.
This section will examine why states respond differently to aggressive states versus
aggressive non-state actors. This part of the study claims that a state can use extreme
force when and if other actors actively consider using these types of weapons to harm
others in the international community (Brown(c) 2011, 217; Brown 2013, 218-219). The
biggest concerns with this section are the issues with the proportional force on actors and
the problem of possession.
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CBRNE weapons produce irreversible impacts on the world and states need a
predetermined plan to address these threats when they appear. The lack of forewarning
and the irreversible effects of these mass casualty weapons means that states will have to
act without complete certainty about who or what is behind the creation of the weapon
(Buchanan 2006, 8). The use of CBRN weapons can easily escalate and sidestep the
ability for governments to consider approaches to these situations (Buchanan 2006, 8).
This scenario requires a predisposition to act upon identifying entities with this threat
capability which means that proportional force must be prescribed before the
identification of the threat.
The impact of these weapons means that the principle of last resort loses
relevance to this situation and that the tiered proportionality system must outline the
correct quantity of force necessary for addressing the threat. CBRNE weapons make the
principle of last resort obsolete because these weapons possess the immediate and
existential impacts that cannot be countered by other instruments. Last resort only harms
the recipient of this type of violence because it imposes a reactionary behavior to
violence (Brown 2013, 219). Under these extreme circumstances, only the tiered
proportionally system can provide ethical guidance for efforts to stop entities with these
weapons. The proportionality system allows governments to use quick and decisive force
to prevent the occurrence of these threats. The system also presents limitations on
excessive force through the sub principle of necessary response. The tiered system
justifies the use of force because this type of threat produces harms that exceed all other
forms of harm. The sub principle of necessary response illustrates the obligation that
states have to eliminate threats of ultimate harm.
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The sub principle of necessary response allows the use of extreme force to
prevent the employment and/or the possession of such weapons because everyone shares
the obligation to eliminate threats of ultimate harm. The two main issues with this sub
principle stem from the identity of the actor and the level of force. These two issues face
concerns about equality in relation applying force and the equal treatment of aggressors
(Toner 2010). Under extreme circumstances, ethical violations occur through the lack of
forethought and planning in attempts to address these concerns. The immediacy of these
threats requires a carefully planned course of action to allow for a streamlined response
when these threats actualize on the world stage. The type of actor affects the response due
to the nature of the decision process and the immediacy of employing the weapons
(Schultze, 2008; Buchanan 2006). These different aspects alter how force is applied and a
better understanding of the capabilities of each type of actor will demonstrate the
necessity for the different treatments.
Concerning the treatment of state and non-state actors, generally, the US treats state
actors differently than non-state actors because of the relative efficiency of employing the
weapon by non-state actors. Though both actors require the same level of expertise to
make and deploy the weapon, proportionality in relation to the speed and efficiency of
each actor determines the level of response necessary to fix the situation. Efficiency can
be defined in terms of decision making and the probability of execution. State actors
possess inherent barriers for using CBRNE weapons due to the political nature of
decision making which creates the disparity of treatment between the two types of actors.
With state actors, the use of CBRNE weapons requires permissions and processes in
order to make the weapon become available for use. The very acquisition of these

34

weapons increases the international attention on the state’s creation and maintenance of
this capability (Younger 2000). International attention creates additional pressure to resist
the use of these weapons. The legal, bureaucratic, and political nature of these weapons
also forces leaders to consider second and third effects on the use of these weapons
(Sagan 1996). The assurance of retaliation prevents most state actors from using these
weapons on other states and, even if states can overcome this barrier, the delivery system
of the weapon could be easily identified.
With state actors, rapid force may be used in isolated attacks on facilities and
personnel that exhibit behavior that would result in their use, but history demonstrates
that state actors generally moderate their attitudes once they achieve these capabilities.
The increased intellectual and technological capabilities to create and store these
weapons historically correlates with a more defensive use of these weapons (Younger
2000, Sagan 1996). Countries with nuclear weapons tend to not go to war with each other
and certainty will not use these weapons unless the other side uses them. The historical
record of state actors’ behavior with these weapons makes it unlikely that any force will
be necessary. But, in the case of irresponsibility, other states can employ force to destroy
the capabilities in isolated attacks. Once the capabilities are neutralized, then the violence
stops because the existential threat is gone. State actors, generally, face international,
domestic, historical and technical barriers that help deter the use of CBRNE weapons.
Non-State actors do not use the same regulation on their employment of CBRNE
weapons and can more effectively maneuver their weapons compared to state actors. The
centralized decision process and deliberate planning make non-state actors the most
likely actors to create an existential crisis for nations when involving these kinds of

35

weapons (Younger 2000). Non-state actors lack external oversight which means that the
barriers of consideration and decision making do not affect their ability to employ the
weapon. Non-state actors do not have the same limitation that state actors inherit which
means that non-state actors are the most likely entities to be exposed to military force.
The use of force on non-state actors creates an additional issue of collateral damage
because nonstate actors inherently reside in closer proximity to civilian populations than
state actors.
The main issue with using force to destroy these weapons revolve around
collateral damage. The reason for using rapid force is to prevent escalation or an
occurrence of an existential crisis. So, the general rule is to seize or destroy the weapon
before it is employed. The need to destroy these weapons may cause collateral damage to
structures and people. Within this situation, the best way to limit collateral damage is to
employ Special Operations units to the site in order to verify the destruction and/or
seizure of the weapon (Brown 2013, 219). CBRNE situations possess the potential to
harm large populations and strategic property and, by forcing a human response to these
situations, real verification can ensure that the production and method of distribution for
the weapon are terminated. Bombing locations and personnel do not guarantee that
weapon production stops and bombs affect more than just the site of the weapon
(Harbour 2011, 237-238). Proportionality limits the acceptable costs of innocent lives and
bombs produce uncontrollable impacts on the objective and the surrounding environment
(Steinhoff 2014, 35-36; Cole 2011, 177). By emphasizing a human response, states can
prevent excessive collateral damage and verify the destruction of the weapon, but paper
recognizes that some situations require alternative methods. The goal for any use of force
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is to first, destroy the weapon and second, reduce the level of collateral damage. The US
already employs this general strategy and it answers the basic ethical concerns for
responding to these types of threats.
The major claim of this section is the necessity of controlled force because, even
in extreme circumstances, it is everyone’s obligation to prevent unfettered violence or
accidental ethical violations. CBRNE and other tier-three scenarios present a unique
challenge because it requires active searching unlike other existential threats (Shulte
2008, 22-24). The relative speed in the creation process and the rapid employing CBRNE
weapons would require more resources and cooperation between states due to the
spillover effects these weapons have. Tier three scenarios provide authorization for
nations to act unilaterally in order to destroy this kind of weapon for the sake of the
international community (Lucas 2003, 125-126). The existential quality of this issue
within the topic of CBRNE falls under the right to actively self-defend one’s nation if the
means and motives for using these weapons are not apparent (Bellamy 2009, 233). The
tiered proportional system provides the best response to this crisis and, without a
definitive ethical framework, extreme force and accidental violations of ethics would be
commonplace within this section of the case study.
Conclusion
The case study brought clarity to the principle of proportionality and helped give
context for the use of rapid force within grey zones. The context of Mexico, Africa, and
CBRNE situations provide examples for applying a proportionality framework and its
sub principles to real-world scenarios. The study highlights the need for more restraint
within the current policies in the United States in order to help prevent the escalation of

37

violence (Orr 2018, 14). The tiered system allows proportional force to be applied to
incidents that could cause immediate existential damage.
The proportional system illustrates important features that allow states to use
force outside of war by identifying a method of evaluating risks. The goal of imposing
the tiered proportionality system is to reduce the use of rapid force. Proportionality
ultimately emphasizes control over one’s action in relation to the situational
understanding (Brown 2003, 184; Orr 2018, 18). The new system operationalizes the
ethical principle into an actionable approach to threats and provides explicit instructions
on how and when force should be considered outside of declared combat zones. It both
enables and limits rapid force by identifying specific principles to govern action and uses
examples to demonstrate how the new system would be incorporated into modern
situations. The application of the tiered system should alter the activity within grey zones
and de-escalation of conflict within those regions. The new interpretation of
proportionality addresses the changes to modern war and provides a way to better apply
ethical principles to the changing nature of the conflict.
The case study provides good grounds for the principle of proportionality but a
further investigation into the evolution of proportionality throughout the different phases
of conflict would provide insight into the ethical roles that leaders have when suggesting
the use of violence as a policy option. Proportionality remains a difficult principle to
articulate due to the contextual nature of its application and further explanations would
create clear guidance for ethical responses to future competition, conflict, and warfare
between international actors.
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